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Abstract
■ Our everyday actions are often performed in the context of a
social interaction. We previously showed that, in adults, selecting
an action on the basis of either social or symbolic cues was asso-
ciated with activations in the fronto-parietal cognitive control net-
work, whereas the presence and use of social versus symbolic
cues was in addition associated with activations in the temporal
and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) social brain network. Here
we investigated developmental changes in these two networks.
Fourteen adults (21–30 years of age) and 14 adolescents (11–
16 years) followed instructions to move objects in a set of shelves.
Interpretation of the instructions was conditional on the point
of view of a visible “director” or the meaning of a symbolic cue
(Director Present vs. Director Absent) and the number of poten-
tial referent objects in the shelves (3-object vs. 1-object). 3-object
trials elicited increased fronto-parietal and temporal activations,
with greater left lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal activations
in adults than adolescents. Social versus symbolic information
led to activations in superior dorsal MPFC, precuneus, and along
the superior/middle temporal sulci. Both dorsal MPFC and left
temporal clusters exhibited a Director × Object interaction, with
greater activation when participants needed to consider the di-
rectorsʼ viewpoints. This effect differed with age in dorsal MPFC.
Adolescents showed greater activation whenever social infor-
mation was present, whereas adults showed greater activation
only when the directorsʼ viewpoints were relevant to task per-
formance. This study thus shows developmental differences in
domain-general and domain-specific PFC activations associated
with action selection in a social interaction context. ■
INTRODUCTION
How is an appropriate action selected among many pos-
sibilities? How do we decide to pick a particular fruit out
of many on offer at the supermarket? The PFC is thought
to support the integration of information from the current
environment (the smell, color, appearance, and identity
of melons on stand) and internal information generated
more or less remotely in time (the plan to invite friends
for dinner, the decision to have melon as a starter, but also
the value associated with melons compared with other
fruits); to orient attention appropriately (toward the stand
and the most appetizing looking melon); and to select an
action appropriate with the current goals (picking up the
selected melon; e.g., Burgess, Gilbert, & Dumontheil,
2007; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Fuster, 2000; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986). Using visual search paradigms,
previous research has investigated the selection of targets
combining different properties in arrays of simple stimuli
(Humphreys, Allen, & Mavritsaki, 2009; Davis & Palmer,
2004; Booth et al., 2003). Results suggest a dissociation
between bottom–up (spontaneous orientation toward a
stimulus) and top–down (intentionally driven by knowl-
edge, expectations, and goals) processes of visuospatial
selective attention (Beck & Kastner, 2009; Hahn, Ross, &
Stein, 2006). However, few studies have attempted to
use more complex stimuli.
A large number of our everyday actions are performed
in a social interactive context. If you are paying at a shop
checkout, you need to perform a series of actions that en-
sures the shopkeeper knows whether you wish to pay by
cash or credit card, and so on. These interactions are
sometimes based on verbal communication and, at other
points, on communicative gestures. For example, making
sure the shopkeeper can see you have taken your credit
card out of your wallet informs the shopkeeper that you
want to pay by card. This type of interaction relies on an
understanding of other peopleʼs mental states, also called
theory of mind or mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2007). Thus,
we often need to use the theory of mind to make top–
down decisions and select actions that are appropriate
to the inferred mental state of the people we interact with
in complex real-world situations. The combination of
domain-general processes supporting selective attention,
action selection and cognitive control, and cognitive pro-
cesses that may be specific to social information and men-
talizing, is the focus of this study. PFC is involved in both
top–down action selection (Burgess et al., 2007) and men-
talizing (Frith & Frith, 2007), in particular, in ill-structured
or novel situations (Apperly, 2011). Following previous
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work in adults (Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore,
2010), the aim of the current study was to investigate the
development of these domain-general and domain-specific
processes during adolescence, using fMRI and a paradigm
that permits the comparison of action selection in a social
versus nonsocial context.
Adolescence is a period of social and psychological de-
velopment during which social awareness and behavior
undergo profound change (Brown, 2004; Eisenberg &
Morris, 2004). At the same time, higher cognitive control
and reasoning abilities mature both in terms of behavior
and brain function (Dumontheil & Blakemore, 2012;
Crone & Ridderinkhof, 2010; Luna, Padmanabhan, &
OʼHearn, 2010; Crone, 2009). As well as alterations in hor-
mone levels and social environment, a possible cause of
these developmental changes are structural changes taking
place in brain areas involved in social cognition, including
the medial PFC (MPFC), the superior temporal cortex, and
the TPJ (Saxe, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith,
2003), and in brain regions involved in cognitive control
tasks, in particular, lateral parts of PFC. Notably, frontal
and temporal lobes undergo protracted structural develop-
ment in humans (Shaw et al., 2008; Gogtay et al., 2004;
Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan,
& Toga, 1999). Developmental functional imaging studies
of mental state attribution have consistently shown that the
MPFC activity during a variety of mentalizing tasks (e.g.,
understanding irony or thinking about oneʼs intentions)
decreases between adolescence and adulthood (see Burnett,
Sebastian, Cohen-Kadosh, & Blakemore, 2011; Blakemore,
2008, for review). In addition, there is evidence of develop-
mental changes in functional connectivity between MPFC
and other parts of the mentalizing network during adoles-
cence (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009). The age-related
changes lie in the part of the MPFC superior to z = 0 la-
beled anterior rostral medial frontal cortex (MFC), which
is recruited by tasks involving self-knowledge, person per-
ception, and mentalizing, in contrast to a more ventral
“orbital MFC” region and a more posterior “posterior
rostral MFC” region (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Other groups
use slightly different subdivisions of the MPFC, with a more
superior border at z = 20 (Van Overwalle, 2009) to distin-
guish between “ventral MPFC” and “dorsal MPFC.” This
dissociation has been related to a distinction betweenmen-
talizing judgments made toward the self or similar others
versus on dissimilar others (Tamir & Mitchell, 2010; Van
Overwalle, 2009; Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008;
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). The developmental cog-
nitive control literature has shown less consistent findings,
with studies showing both decreases and increases in
lateral PFC activations as well as qualitative changes
with age during adolescence (see Crone & Ridderinkhof,
2010; Luna et al., 2010; Astle & Scerif, 2009; Casey, Jones,
& Hare, 2008; Bunge & Wright, 2007).
The ability to infer mental states, or mentalizing, devel-
ops in a step-wise fashion during the first 5 years of life
(Frith & Frith, 2003) at which point children are able to
reason explicitly about theory of mind. However, this abil-
ity does not always lead to an automatic, on-line use of
theory of mind information even in adolescents and
adults. For instance, Keysar and colleagues (Keysar, Lin,
& Barr, 2003; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000) de-
signed a task in which participants were faced with a set
of shelves containing objects that were either visible or
not visible from the viewpoint of a “Director” (a confed-
erate). The director asked participants to move objects in
the shelves, and critical instructions required participants
to use information about the directorʼs viewpoint to cor-
rectly interpret their instructions. In this Director task,
adults did not reliably use their theory of mind knowledge
to interpret the intentions of others (Keysar et al., 2000,
2003). Around 50% of the time, they failed to use infor-
mation about the directorʼs perspective and instead erro-
neously used their own (egocentric) viewpoint only when
trying to follow the directorʼs instruction. These results
were replicated using a computerized version of the para-
digm and controlling for the inhibitory control demands
of the task with a matched no-director condition (Apperly
et al., 2010). We have further found that egocentric errors
in this task are accentuated in adolescence, with an even
stronger egocentric bias observed in 14- to 17-year-old
adolescents than in young adults (Dumontheil, Apperly,
& Blakemore, 2010). These results suggest that the ability
to take another personʼs perspective to select appropriate
actions is still undergoing development at this relatively
late stage. The Director task differs from other theory of
mind tasks in that it requires participants to have a func-
tioning theory of mind, to compute the perspective and
intentions of another person (the director), and use this
theory of mind information in concert with other cogni-
tive processes such as executive functions to overcome
their egocentric bias and select the appropriate response
quickly and accurately (Apperly et al., 2010). It is proposed
that it is this interaction between theory of mind and ex-
ecutive functions that continues to develop in late adoles-
cence and is still prone to errors in adults (see Dumontheil,
Apperly, et al., 2010).
In the current study, we adapted a computerized version
of the Director task (Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil,
Apperly, et al., 2010) for fMRI (Dumontheil, Küster, et al.,
2010). Whereas the previous studies using this paradigm
were designed to probe the use of social cues (perspective
taking) in a natural way via assessing differential error rates
(which are naturally quite high as described above), the
present version included extensive task instructions and
practice to minimize error rates and compare fMRI data
across groups performing at consistently high levels of
accuracy. Our goal was to use this task variant to assess
the development between adolescence and adulthood of
the neural substrates associated with (1) the selection of
an appropriate action in the context of alternative options
proposed in a complex stimulus; (2) the presence of social
information versus symbolic cues as part of the stimuli;
and (3) the use of social cues as opposed to symbolic cues
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for the selection of the appropriate action from the alter-
native options. Note that, although beyond the scope of
the current study, the computation of the value of different
objects or actions may be another important aspect of
action selection and may be affected by personal and
social factors developing during adolescence.
If mentalizing is a specialized and domain-specific cog-
nitive process (e.g., Leslie, 2005; Sperber & Wilson, 2002;
Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998; see Apperly, 2011,
for discussion), then we might expect differential per-
formance and the recruitment of regions of the social
brain network (Frith & Frith, 2007; Brothers, 1990) when
the guiding information is of social nature compared with
more arbitrary symbolic stimuli. This social stimuli con-
dition might thus recruit both domain-general action se-
lection resources and domain-specific resources that are
involved in processing social information and mentaliz-
ing. Such a pattern has previously been observed in adults,
with nonoverlapping brain regions implicated in response
selection and belief attribution during a belief attribution
task (Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006; see also Saxe, Carey, &
Kanwisher, 2004).
Participants followed auditory instructions to move ob-
jects in a set of shelves. A 2 × 2 factorial design with the
factors Director (Director Present vs. Director Absent)
and Object (3-object vs. 1-object) was employed. In the
Director Present condition, two directors were shown
on the display, one female and one male. One of them
stood behind the shelves, facing the participant, whereas
the other stood on the same side of the shelves as the
participant. In the 3-object condition, participants needed
to use the social cues, that is, the position of the speaking
director, to select and move the appropriate object (see
Figure 1A). The instructions in these blocks referred
to an object that was one of three exemplars in the
shelves (the ball). Two of these objects could correspond
to the heard instruction (“Move the large ball up”) de-
pending on the directorʼs viewpoint. The largest ball (or
equivalent) was always located in a closed shelf (not
visible from the back), whereas the second largest ball
was located in an open shelf. Importantly, when consider-
ing the identity of the director (male voice), only one of
the objects was the appropriate response (the football);
the other object corresponded to the other viewpoint
and was thus a distractor (the basketball). The third object
was another type of distractor that did not fit any of the
perspectives (the tennis ball). On half of the Director
Present 3-object trials, the perspective of the director issu-
ing the instruction was different from that of the partici-
pant; on the other half, the directorʼs and participantʼs
perspectives were the same. This varied on a trial-by-trial
basis; thus, participants needed to take into account the
directorʼs perspective on every trial. In Director Present
1-object trials, there was no need to take into account
the directorʼs perspective to identify the correct object
(e.g., “Move the turtle left”), as there were no distractors
or other referents, and so this resembled a bottom–up,
visual pop-out as opposed to a visual search (Buschman
&Miller, 2007). The Director Absent condition was logically
equivalent, but the directors were replaced by symbolic
cues (see Figure 1B).
We previously obtained results on this task in a group of
adult participants (Dumontheil, Küster, et al., 2010). Selec-
tion of an appropriate action when faced with alternatives
(3-object vs. 1-object contrast, collapsed across Director
Present and Director Absent conditions) was associated
with domain-general bilateral brain activations located pri-
marily in the fronto-parietal cortex, with additional activa-
tions in the inferior temporal cortex. Processing of social
(Director Present) versus symbolic information (Director
Absent) was associated with specific activations in the
superior dorsal MPFC and STS. Finally, using perspective
taking in this communicative context (Director × Object
interaction), which required participants to think not only
Figure 1. Examples of a
3-object trial in the Director
Present (A) and the Director
Absent (B) conditions. In
both conditions in this
example, participants hear
the instruction: “Move the
large ball up” in either a
male or female voice. In
both examples, if the voice
is female, the object to
be moved would be the
basketball, because in the
Director Present condition
(A) the female Director is
standing in front of the
shelves and can see all the
objects, whereas in the Director Absent condition (B) the two boxes below the “F” (for “female”) indicate that all objects can be moved by the
participant. If the voice is male, the object to be moved would be the football, because in the Director Present condition (A) the male Director
is standing behind the shelves and therefore cannot see the larger basketball in the occluded slot, whereas in the Director Absent condition
(B) the single clear box below the “M” (for “male”) indicates that only objects in open shelves can be moved.
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about what the other person sees, but also about his or her
intentions, led to further recruitment of superior dorsal
MPFC and the left middle temporal gyri, extending into
the temporal pole.
The focus of the current study was the difference be-
tween the adolescent and adult groups in these three con-
trasts of interests: (1) 3-object > 1-object; (2) Director
Present > Director Absent; and (3) Director × Object.
In line with the adult data, we expected activation in the
cognitive control fronto-parietal regions for the first com-
parison and activation in the social brain network in the
latter two comparisons, which contrast the presence of
social versus symbolic information and the specific per-
spective taking requirement. In terms of developmental
effects, for the first comparison, as the direction of changes
in parietal and frontal cortex activations with age in cogni-
tive control tasks is inconsistent in the literature and may
be task dependent, we tested for both developmental
increases and decreases in the 3-object vs. 1-object com-
parison. Regarding the second and third comparisons,
the social brain has shown more reliable decreases be-
tween adolescence and adulthood in MPFC activations
(Blakemore, 2008) and increases in temporal cortex activa-
tions (Burnett et al., 2011; Blakemore, 2008) in a variety
of social cognition tasks. Our predictions thus aligned
with this previous literature: We predicted decreased
MPFC activation and increased temporal cortex activa-
tion with age in the Director Present versus Director
Absent comparison and/or more specifically in the Director
Present 3-object condition, which requires on-line use
of perspective taking information. Regarding the MPFC,
our prediction was focused on the dorsal MPFC on the
basis of our previous results in adults as well as the associa-
tion between this region and mentalizing judgments per-




Fourteen adult (mean age = 24.9 years, SD = 3.0 years,
range = 21.3–30.6 years) and 14 adolescent (mean age =
14.0 years, SD = 1.6 years, range = 11.6–16.8 years)
right-handed female volunteers were included in the
analyses (two additional adolescent participants per-
formed poorly on the task due to malfunctioning head-
phones and were excluded). All participants spoke
English fluently and had no history of psychiatric or
neurological disorder. Adult participants or the parents
of the adolescent participants gave informed consent,
and the study was approved by the local ethics com-
mittee. General ability was assessed using the two sub-
testsʼ format (Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning) of the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler,
1999). Estimated IQ normalized for age did not signifi-
cantly differ between the adolescents (mean IQ = 122,
SD = 12, range = 106–140) and adults (mean IQ =
110, SD = 10, range = 100–134; t(26) = 0.735, p = .47).
Design and Stimulus Material
Stimuli consisted of sets of 4 × 4 shelves with objects lo-
cated in half of the shelves. Five of the shelves had a gray
background (Figure 1). On each trial, participants were
given instructions via headphones, by either a male or a fe-
male voice, to move one of the eight objects in the shelves
to a different slot, either up, down, left, or right (note that
this was the participantʼs left or right). A 2 × 2 factorial
within-subject design was used with the factors Director
(Present vs. Absent) and Object (1-object vs. 3-object) vary-
ing between blocks.
Director Factor
In the Director Present (DP) condition, the display in-
cluded two directors, one female and one male. In the Di-
rector Absent (DA) condition, there were no directors in
the display (Figure 1). Instead, the letters “F” for female
and “M” for male were shown beside the shelves. Below
each of the letters, there was either one transparent box,
which indicated to participants that only objects in open
shelves should be moved, or two boxes, one gray and
one transparent, which indicated that there was no restric-
tion on the participantʼs choice and all objects (both in
open shelves and occluded shelves) could be moved. For
example, in Figure 1B, if participants heard the male voice
say, “Move the large ball up,” they would need to reason
that, because the M is above one clear box, they could only
pick objects in clear shelves and thus should ignore the
basketball in the gray slot and move the football. These
rules had precisely the same consequences as the position
of the director in the DP blocks. In DP blocks, the physical
position of the director issuing the instruction varied on a
trial-by-trial basis; similarly, in DA blocks, the M/F rules
changed on a trial-by-trial basis.
Object Factor
Instructions in 1-object blocks (e.g., in Figure 1, “Move
the turtle left”) referred to a unique target object (there
was only one turtle), which was in an open shelf. Instruc-
tions in 3-object blocks (e.g., “Move the large ball up”)
could refer to an object in a closed shelf (with a gray back-
ground) or an object in an open shelf, which could both
be described with the same instruction (e.g., “large ball”).
Which of the possible referents was in fact correct was
determined by whether the director giving the instruction
(identified as male or female by his or her voice) was at the
back or front of the shelves (in DP) or whether the cues
indicated that only objects in open shelves could bemoved
(in DA). This manipulation ensured that in DP 3-object
blocks, participants had to consider the directorʼs perspec-
tive (which was different from their own perspective on
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50% of the trials) to know which was the correct object to
move. In DP 1-object blocks, the directorʼs perspective
made no difference to the correct interpretation of his or
her instructions, and thus, participants could use their
own perspective to select the appropriate object on all
trials. In the DA condition, perspective taking was not
involved.
There were 48 object-shelf configurations, each con-
taining eight objects. Sets of three exemplars of the same
object were used for 3-object trials (e.g., three drums).
These objects differed in either size (large/small) or position
(top/bottom) and were distributed so that the smallest/
largest or topmost/bottommost object identified in the
instruction was in a closed shelf and the second smallest/
largest or topmost/bottommost object and the remaining
object were in open shelves. Five additional unique objects
were distributed in three gray-backed closed shelves and
two open shelves. Those objects in the open shelves could
be used for 1-object trials.
To move objects, participants used a trackball mouse,
rolling the trackball with their thumb and pressing the
left mouse button with the index finger of their right
hand. On each trial, participants first moved the mouse
cursor from the middle of the screen to the selected ob-
ject, then clicked on the object, and dragged it to the
appropriate slot, before releasing the mouse button. RTs
were calculated as the delay between the presentation of
the visual stimulus and the pressing of the mouse button.
Accuracy was measured on the basis of which object was
moved.
On each trial, the visual stimulus and the auditory in-
struction were presented over a period of 2.2 sec, after
which the display remained on the screen for another
3.8 sec. Between trials, a blank screen was shown for
200 msec. The task was programmed with Cogent 2000
and Cogent Graphics (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php)
implemented in Matlab 6.5 (Mathworks, Inc., Sherborn,
MA). Standardized instructions were read to participants
and included example stimuli in which they had to
state which objects should be moved for the different
directors and voices. A practice session including one
block of each of the four conditions was run outside the
scanner to ensure that participants understood the task
and could perform it correctly. If a participant did not
take into account the directorʼs perspective appropriately,
this was highlighted and the task requirements were ex-
plained again. Participants also practiced using the track-
ball mouse ahead of scanning and in the scanner (see
Dumontheil, Kuster, et al., 2010).
Participants performed three scanning sessions (two
adolescent participants performed two sessions only be-
cause of time constraints). Each session consisted of 16
task blocks with four trials in each block. There were four
types of experimental block: DA 1-object; DA 3-object;
DP 1-object; DA 3-object. Each of the 48 object-shelf con-
figurations was shown once in each block type; thus,
there were 12 blocks of four trials for each block type.
Task blocks lasted 24.8 sec and were preceded by an in-
struction screen presented for 2 sec, which indicated
whether the upcoming block was a DP or DA block.
The order of the four block types was counterbalanced
within and between sessions. A fixation baseline block
lasting 20 sec was included after each set of four task
blocks.
fMRI Data Acquisition
3-D T1-weighted fast-field echo structural images and
multislice T2-weighted echo-planar volumes with BOLD
contrast (repetition time = 3 sec; echo time = 50 msec;
acquisition time = 2.9143 sec) were obtained using a 1.5-T
MRI scanner (Siemens TIM Avanto, Erlangen, Germany).
Functional imaging data were acquired in two or three
scanning sessions lasting approximately 8 min 40 sec each
in which 174 volumes were obtained. The first two volumes
of each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium
effects. Each functional brain volume was composed of
35 axial slices with an in-plane resolution of 3 × 3 ×
3 mm, positioned to cover the whole brain. A T1-weighted
anatomical image lasting 5 min 30 sec was acquired after
the first two functional sessions for each participant.
Data Analysis
Behavioral Data
RTs and accuracy in all four conditions were recorded and
analyzed using a 2 (Age Group: Adolescents vs. Adults) × 2
(Director: DA vs. DP) × 2 (Object: 1-object vs. 3-object)
mixed model repeated-measures ANOVA to investigate
the effects of each task factor, the interaction between task
factors and their interaction with age.
fMRI Data
fMRI image preprocessing and analysis were carried out using
SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, UK), implemented in MATLAB 7.8 (Mathworks,
Inc., Sherborn,MA). To correct formovement effects, images
were realigned with a fourth-degree B-spline interpolation.
These realigned images were corrected for differences in
acquisition times and were then normalized to a standard
EPI template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) reference brain. The resulting 3 × 3 × 3 mm im-
ages were finally spatially smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM
Gaussian kernel. Analyses of the movement parameters
showed that translation within each session was <3 mm
in all participants. Mean movement per session was cal-
culated for translations and rotations in each direction for
each subject. Independent t tests were used to compare
the means of these values over the sessions between the
two age groups. There was no significant difference for
translations [all t(26) < .43, p > .67] nor for rotations [all
t(26) < .28, p > .78].
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For each participant, the scanning sessions were treated
as separate time series; statistical parametric maps were
created and estimated using a general linearmodel for each
time series (Friston et al., 1995). Included in themodel were
six boxcar regressors, modeling the instruction, fixation
and four types of task blocks, plus one event-related regres-
sor representing error trials. All regressors were convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function and, to-
gether with regressors representing residual movement-
related artifacts and themean over scans, comprised the full
model for each session. The data andmodel were high-pass
filtered to a cut-off of 1/128 Hz. Parameter estimates calcu-
lated from the least mean squares fit of the model to the
data were used in four pairwise contrasts comparing each
block type with the fixation baseline. These contrasts were
entered into a Condition × Age Group × Participant flex-
ible factorial design second-level analysis. The factor partici-
pant was included tomodel the repeated aspect of the data.
Main effects of Object (3-object > 1-object) and Director
(DP > DA and DA > DP) and the interaction between
the two factors and with age group were determined using
the t statistic on a voxel-by-voxel basis. Statistical contrasts
were used to create SPM{Z} maps thresholded at p< .001
at the voxel level and at family-wise error (FWE)-corrected
p < .05 at the cluster level (corresponding to a minimum
cluster size of 82 voxels determined with SPM8). Activations
that survived whole-brain FWE correction at p < .05 are
indicated. Analyses performed with age as a continuous
regressor did not highlight any regions not observed with
the age group analyses and are thus not reported. All coor-
dinates are given in MNI space. ROI analyses based on the
main effect of DP > DA were further performed to test for
orthogonal interaction effects between the Director, Ob-
ject, and Age Group factors in the brain regions identified
as responding to the social stimuli. Additional analyses ex-
plored possible continuous effects of age and differences
between the seven youngest and seven oldest adolescent
participants and the adults. Note that these analyses are
limited by the age range gap between 17 and 21 and under-
powered by the small N of the adolescent subgroups. Sta-
tistical threshold for the ROI analyses performed in SPSS
was p < .05 (two-tailed).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Accuracy was calculated for each of the four conditions in
each session. Four sessions (from three participants) were
discarded from further analyses because of poor perfor-
mance in one of the conditions (accuracy < 50%). In-
cluded in the analyses were thus 14 adults (13 with three
sessions, 1 with two sessions) and 14 adolescents (10 with
three sessions, 3 with two sessions, 1 with one session).
Accuracy and median RTs in correct trials were analyzed
using a 2 (Age Group: Adolescent, Adult) × 2 (Director:
DP vs. DA) × 2 (Object: 1-object vs. 3-object) mixed model
repeated-measures ANOVA.
Accuracy was higher in the DP than in the DA condition
[main effect of Director, F(1, 26) = 6.29, p = .019] and
higher in 1-object than 3-object blocks [main effect of
Object, F(1, 26) = 38.29, p < .001; Figure 2A]. There
was no main effect of age group ( p > .6) and no inter-
action between age group and the task factors (all inter-
action p values > .22). A similar pattern of performance
was observed in terms of RTs. Participants were faster in
the DP than DA condition, F(1, 26) = 48.36, p< .001, and
in 1-object than 3-object blocks, F(1, 26) = 465.16, p <
.001, and there was no main effect of age and no inter-
action with age group (all ps > .24). However, there
was a significant interaction between Director and Object,
F(1, 26) = 15.69, p < .001, reflecting a greater effect of
Object in the DA condition (Figure 2B). Thus, effects of
Director and Object were observed on both measures
Figure 2. Behavioral performance. (A) Percentage errors (mean ± SE ) in each of the four conditions, plotted separately for the two age groups.
There was no main effect of age group and no interaction between age group and condition. However, overall, participants made more errors
in 3-object than 1-object blocks and more errors in the Director Absent than Director Present condition. (B) Median RT (mean ± SE ) in each
of the four task conditions, plotted separately for the two age groups. A similar pattern of effects of the Object and Director factors was observed
for RTs as for accuracy. In addition, the interaction between the Object and Director factors was significant, with a larger RT difference between
3-object and 1-object trials in Director Absent (mean = 795 msec) than in Director Present (mean = 642 msec).
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of performance, but the adolescentsʼ and adultsʼ perfor-
mance did not differ.
fMRI Results
The four first-level contrasts comparing each block type
[Director (2) × Object (2)] to fixation were entered in a
flexible factorial second-level analysis, including age group
and participant as factors.
Object Factor
A broad bilateral network of fronto-parietal, occipital, and
inferior temporal regions showed increased BOLD signal
in 3-object compared with 1-object blocks (Table 1 and
Figure 3A), that is, when the participants had to identify
a specific object to move among three exemplars of the
same object type (e.g., one of several balls on Figure 1) as
opposed to when there was only one exemplar of the
object (e.g., the turtle on Figure 1). Greatest increases
in BOLD signal were observed bilaterally in superior and
inferior parietal lobules, superior frontal sulci, and precu-
neus. Other regions included the medial superior frontal
gyrus and anterior parts of PFC in the middle frontal gyri
bilaterally.
Object and Age Group factors significantly interacted
in fronto-parietal regions in the left hemisphere. Adults
showed increased BOLD signal in the 3-object vs. 1-object
blocks, compared with adolescents, in the intraparietal
sulcus and in a cluster extending from the precentral
gyrus to the inferior frontal gyrus and insula (Table 1 and
Table 1. Coordinates and Z Values for Regions of Significant Differences in BOLD Signal in the Main Effect Contrast of Object
[3-Object > 1-Object] and the Interaction between Object and Age Group [(Adults 3-Object > 1-Object) > (Adolescents 3-Object >
1-Objects)] ( p < .001 Uncorrected at the Voxel-level, p < .05 FWE Corrected at the Cluster Level)
L/R Brodmannʼs Area MNI (x y z) Z Score p(FWE)* Cluster Size
Main Effect of Object: 3-Object > 1-Object
Superior parietal lobule R 7 27 −64 52 >8 <.001 14181
IPS L 40 −39 −49 46 >8 <.001
MTG/occipital gyrus R 39/19 42 −79 22 >8 <.001
SFS R 6 30 −4 64 >8 <.001
Precuneus R 7 6 −64 49 >8 <.001
SFS L 6 −21 −4 52 >8 <.001
IFG R 44 48 8 34 >8 <.001
MFG R 9 45 26 31 >8 <.001
Supramarginal gyrus R 40 39 −40 40 >8 <.001
Precentral gyrus L 6 −42 2 37 >8 <.001
ITS R 37 48 −55 −14 7.61 <.001
Occipital gyrus L 19 −39 −73 −11 6.75 <.001
MFG L 9 −45 23 40 6.32 <.001
MFG L 10/46 −42 47 7 6.22 <.001
Medial SFG R 6 6 14 49 6.20 <.001
Thalamus L −12 −16 10 4.93 .010 117
Age Group × Object Interaction: Adults > Adolescents (3-Object > 1-Object)
Precentral gyrus L 6 −45 5 31 4.96 .009 368
Inferior frontal gyrus L 45 −42 23 22 4.60
Insula L −39 17 7 4.12
IPS/supramarginal gyrus L 40 −45 −49 43 4.27 .018 110
IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; IPS = intraparietal sulcus; ITS = inferior temporal sulcus; MFG = middle frontal gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus;
SFG = superior frontal gyrus; SFS = superior frontal sulcus; L/R: left/right.
*Voxel-wise whole-brain FWE-corrected p-value, where p < .05.
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Figure 3B). This significant interaction between Object
and Age Group reflected more bilateral activations in
frontal and parietal regions in adults than adolescents (Fig-
ure 3C). Note that these two clusters remained significant
when mean RT and accuracy for each condition and par-
ticipant were entered as covariates in the second-level
analyses [left frontal cluster: Z = 4.84, p(FWE) < .001,
326 voxels; left parietal cluster: Z = 4.27, p(FWE) = .029,
96 voxels].
Both younger and older adolescent subgroups showed
weaker 3-object than 1-object fronto-parietal activation
than adults ( ps < .05) and did not differ from each other
(parietal region: p > .5; frontal region: p = .066, trend
for greater activation in the younger adolescents). The
activation in 3-object vs. 1-object trials also significantly
increased with age entered as a continuous variable
( ps < .01), although this effect was less significant than
the Age Group effect.
Director Factor
When comparing the Director Present condition to the
Director Absent condition, that is, when the cues were
social stimuli rather than symbols, increased BOLD signal
was observed in bilateral superior and middle temporal
cortex regions along the STS and extending into the ante-
rior temporal cortex, as well as in the right inferior frontal
gyrus, dorsal MPFC, precuneus, and occipital gyrus (Table 2
and Figure 4A). The reverse contrast, that is, when the cues
were not social but symbolic and rule-based, revealed
increased BOLD signal in the left parietal cortex only
(Table 2 and Figure 4A). There was no significant inter-
action between Director and Age Group factors.
Director × Object Interaction
Whole-brain analyses at the cluster FWE-corrected thresh-
old p < .05 showed no brain regions with significant
Director × Object or Director × Object × Age Group
interactions. An ROI approach (which is potentially less
robust because it is biased toward particular clusters) was
thus used as follows: mean parameter estimates were calcu-
lated for all clusters of the DP > DA contrast and analyzed
in SPSS using a mixed model repeated-measures ANOVA.
The ROI clusters were in the left temporal cortex, right tem-
poral cortex, occipital gyrus, dorsal MPFC, precuneus, and
right inferior frontal gyrus (see Table 2 and Figure 4A).
Director × Object and Director × Object × Age Group
interactions were tested using mixed repeated-measures
ANOVAs on the mean parameter estimates in these ROIs.
The aim was to identify regions that showed increased
BOLD signal when participants had to take into account
Figure 3. Effect of the Object factor and interaction between Object and Age Group. (A) Main effect of the Object factor. Regions showing increased
BOLD signal in 3-object compared with 1-object blocks across age groups are rendered on the SPM8 surface mesh template. From left to right:
lateral view of the left hemisphere, lateral and medial views of the right hemisphere. (B) Object × Age Group interaction. Regions showing increased
BOLD signal in 3-object compared with 1-object trials in the adults compared with the adolescents are rendered on the SPM8 surface mesh template
(lateral view of the left hemisphere). Parameter estimates were extracted and plotted for the two significant clusters, in the left intraparietal sulcus
(mean of 110 voxels) and the left lateral PFC (mean of 368 voxels). (C) On the right, glass brain representations show the regions of increased BOLD
signal in the 3-object compared with 1-object blocks in each age group separately. Contrasts were thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected at the voxel
level, p < .05 FWE corrected at the cluster level.
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the Directorsʼ perspective to perform the task correctly. A
significant Director×Object interactionwas observed in the
left temporal cortex cluster, F(1, 26) = 6.12, p= .020, and in
the dorsal MPFC cluster, F(1, 26) = 4.87, p = .036. In both
cases, the difference in BOLD signal between DP and DA
was greater in 3-object than 1-object trials. In addition, the
Director × Object × Age Group interaction was significant
in the dorsal MPFC cluster, F(1, 26) = 4.76, p = .038. This
three-way interaction reflected the fact that the difference
between DP and DA was greater in 3-object than 1-object
trials in adults ( p = .014) but not in adolescents ( p > .9;
Figure 4B). Adolescents thus showed greater BOLD sig-
nal in DP than DA in both 1-object and 3-object trials,
whereas adults showed a greater DP than DA activation in
3-object trials specifically, that is, when the perspective of
the directors needed to be taken into account.
Table 2. Coordinates and Z Values for Regions of Significant Differences in BOLD Signal in the Main Effect Contrasts of the Director
Factor ( p < .001 Uncorrected at the Voxel Level, p < .05 FWE Corrected at the Cluster Level)
L/R Brodmannʼs Area MNI (x y z) Z Score p(FWE)* Cluster Size
Main Effect of Director: Director Present > Director Absent
MTG/STS L 39 −45 −73 13 7.53 <.001 1537
STG/STS L 22 −54 −46 13 5.53 .001
MTG L 21 −48 2 −26 4.91 .011
Fusiform gyrus L 37 −39 −40 −17 4.81 .017
MTG/STS L 21 −54 −10 −14 4.79 .018
Hippocampus L −33 −10 −20 4.36
SOG/Cuneus L 17/18 −12 −94 4 7.15 <.001 253
MTG/STS R 22/39 57 −58 13 6.34 <.001 952
STG/STS R 22 51 −46 16 5.13 .004
MTG R 21 51 5 −20 4.33
STG/STS R 21 48 −31 1 3.9
MTG R 21 51 −16 −8 3.87
Precuneus L 7 −6 −52 43 5.41 .001 325
Precuneus L 7 −12 −52 31 4.59 .042
Cingulate gyrus R 31 6 −55 28 4.3
Medial SFG L 8 −12 47 46 4.98 .008 533
SFG L 8 −18 38 55 4.84 .015
Medial SFG L 10 −6 56 25 4.06
Medial SFG L 10 −9 50 16 3.97
Medial SFG R 9 6 53 37 3.94
SFG L 8 −21 26 49 3.91
Cingulate gyrus L 32 −12 47 4 3.45
IFG R 45 57 29 4 4.59 .042 85
Main Effect of Director: Director Absent > Director Present
Middle occipital gyrus L 19 −24 −67 37 5.19 <.001 362
Intraparietal sulcus L 40 −30 −55 46 4.80
Supramarginal gyrus L 7 −42 −55 61 3.94
IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; MTG = middle temporal gyrus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus; SOG = superior occipital gyrus; STG = superior temporal
gyrus; STS = superior temporal sulcus; L/R = left/right.
*Voxel-wise whole-brain FWE-corrected p-value, where p < .05.
2088 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 24, Number 10
Although the Object × Age Group interactions of DP vs.
DA did not reach significance when comparing the younger
and older adolescent subgroups to the adults ( p= .071 and
p = .152, respectively), the same pattern of no difference
in DP vs. DA activation between 3-object and 1-object trials
( ps > .7) was observed in both adolescent groups. Simi-
larly, the interaction between Object and Age Group as a
continuous variable for DP vs. DA activation ( p = .2) did
not reach significance, suggesting the developmental effect
was best accounted for by group (adolescents vs. adults).
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the development of the neural
substrates of action selection when the information guiding
the choice is symbolic or social in nature, which enabled us
to investigate domain-general processes (common to the
symbolic and social conditions) and domain-specific pro-
cesses (specific to the social or symbolic conditions). The
paradigm we used required participants to take the per-
spective of another person in an implicit manner and re-
spond appropriately in a communicative context. First,
we showed that the fronto-parietal and temporal brain net-
work showing increased BOLD signal when participants
had to identify a target among distractors showed greater
BOLD signal in adults than adolescents in the left lateral
PFC and parietal cortex (Figure 3). Second, the processing
of social versus symbolic stimuli led to social brain network
activations in the superior dorsal MPFC, precuneus, and
large temporal clusters; the reverse contrast showed activa-
tion in the left parietal cortex only, in a region sensitive to
the Object factor (Figure 4). Although no whole-brain
interaction effects were observed, ROI analyses were per-
formed on those clusters showing greater activations in
Director Present than Director Absent trials to investigate
specific BOLD signal increases associated with the use of
social versus symbolic cues to guide the selection of the
appropriate target among the distractor objects. The left
temporal cluster and dorsal MPFC regions showed an inter-
action between Director and Object, with increased BOLD
signal in Director Present 3-object trials, when the perspec-
tive of the director needed to be taken into account. The
dorsal MPFC region showed a further significant three-way
interaction, between Director, Object and Age Group,
showing that the adults, but not the adolescents, exhibited
specifically greater Director Present than Director Absent
activation in 3-object trials. Adolescents showed greater
BOLD signal in the superior dorsal MPFC in Director
Figure 4. Effect of the Director factor and interaction with Object and Age Group. (A) Main effect of the Director factor across age groups. Regions
showing increased BOLD signal in the Director Present compared with Director Absent blocks (in yellow–red color scale) or in the reverse Director
Absent compared with Director Present blocks (in green–blue color scale) are rendered on the SPM8 surface mesh template. From left to right:
medial and lateral view of the left hemisphere, lateral view of the right hemisphere. (B) ROI analyses testing for interactions between Director
and Object and between Director, Object, and Age Group. Mean parameter estimates in two clusters of the Director Present > Director Absent
contrast across age groups showed a significant interaction between Director and Object factors, with greatest activation in the DP 3-object condition (left
temporal cluster, extending along the middle temporal gyrus and STS, mean of 1537 voxels; superior dorsal MPFC cluster, mean of 533 voxels). The
superior dorsal MPFC cluster showed a further significant three-way interaction between Director, Object, and Age Group, with a significant increase
in [DP − DA] in 3-object vs. 1-object blocks in the adults only. (C) Director Present vs. Director Absent contrast in each age group. Contrasts were
thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected at the voxel level, p < .05 FWE corrected at the cluster level.
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Present than Director Absent both in 1-object and 3-object
trials (Figure 4).
Development of the Integration of Information
to Guide Action Selection
The comparison between trials requiring the identifica-
tion and selection of one of three objects compared with
a single target object highlights brain regions recruited in
top–down control of attention and goal-directed action.
Participants needed to remember the instruction and
integrate it with the social or symbolic rule-based cues
to identify which of the three exemplar of the target
object (e.g., ball) is the correct one to move. All par-
ticipants were slower and less accurate in 3-object than
1-object trials, but the age groups did not differ (Figure 2).
Over the whole group of participants, a large bilateral
network of brain regions showed greater BOLD signal in
3-object compared with 1-object blocks of trials (Figure 3A).
Frontal and parietal cortices have been proposed to be
the source of spatial attentional modulation of the ventral
visual system during object recognition or discrimina-
tion (Beck & Kastner, 2009; Tong, 2003; Corbetta, 1998;
Corbetta & Shulman, 1998). This network has also been
shown to drive nonspatial, feature-based (e.g., color) selec-
tive attention (Giesbrecht, Woldorff, Song, & Mangun,
2003). The network observed in the current study in-
cludes the fronto-parietal cortex clusters (see Table 1)
identified as supporting top–down or endogeneous con-
trol of selective attention in a spatial cueing paradigm
(Hahn et al., 2006) and also those observed in a spatial
and feature cueing paradigm (Giesbrecht et al., 2003)
and in a visual search paradigm (Booth et al., 2003). Dif-
ferences in the location of occipital activations and in the
spread of activations between these paradigms and the
current study may relate to the cueing in this study being
partly based on auditory verbal stimuli and/or to the greater
complexity of the visual stimuli in this study.
There is little previous research regarding neural changes
associated with the development of selective attention.
Booth et al. (2003) report greater activations in the left
thalamus and the right anterior cingulate in children
(aged 9–11 years old) compared with adults (aged 20–
30 years) when contrasting a nine-stimuli array visual con-
junction search to a simple stimulus detection response;
no brain region showed greater activation in adults than
in children. In the present study, the target stimuli varied
on a trial-by-trial basis, thus BOLD signal changes during
the task reflect the encoding and integration of the auditory
and visual target information, in addition to the simpler
visual detection of the appropriate target shape (e.g., a
ball). The developmental results obtained in the current
study revealed increased BOLD signal in adults compared
with adolescents in the left precentral gyrus extending into
the inferior frontal gyrus and in the left intraparietal sulcus/
supramarginal gyrus when comparing 3-object with 1-object
trials (Figure 3B). The literature on the development of
the neural substrates of attention and cognitive control
has not shown a consistent direction of changes in BOLD
signal with age (Luna et al., 2010). However, lateral PFC
and parietal cortex are key regions that consistently show
developmental changes. Overall, the pattern of results in
the literature suggests that, although core regions of the
circuitry underlying cognitive control are on-line early in
development, the network of brain regions underlying,
for example, working memory is still developing during
adolescence (Crone & Ridderinkhof, 2010; Luna et al.,
2010). The current 3-object versus 1-object comparison
contains a combination of attention (visual search), working
memory (remembering the rule, instruction and already
attended aspects of the stimuli), and inhibition demands
(inhibiting attention toward the distractor stimuli and its
associated response). In this context, the results show that
adolescent development is associated with increasingly
bilateral frontal and parietal activations.
In summary, this study shows fronto-parietal and tem-
poral cortex activations when participants are required to
integrate complex visual and auditory information to
search and select one of two possible actions versus when
the action to perform is more simply identified. Despite
similar performance, adolescents show hypoactivation of
the left frontal and parietal cortex.
Processing of Social versus Symbolic Information
The instructions were fully matched between the Director
Present and Director Absent conditions. However, the vi-
sual stimuli differed, with two characters standing in front
or at the back of the set of shelves in the Director Present
condition, versus the letters F and M and gray or transpar-
ent boxes in the Director Absent condition. Main effects
of Director were observed for both accuracy and RTs, with
better performance in the Director Present condition. Pre-
vious research using a behavioral variant of the Director
task showed both young and adult participants were
much more error prone in the Director Present condition
(Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil, Apperly, et al., 2010).
However, these studies investigated participantsʼ natural
tendency to take into account the directorʼs perspective.
In this study, participants went through a training session
where their performance was corrected if they did not take
into account the directorsʼ perspectives. This aspect of
the task was stressed as important, and accordingly, we
obtained high accuracy rates. The performance benefit
associated with the social versus the symbolic stimuli is
in line with previous studies showing that participants per-
form faster (den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 2005)
and more accurately (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986) on social
compared with nonsocial tasks.
fMRI results showed that the presence of the symbolic
stimuli was associated with greater activation in the left
parietal cortex only, which overlapped with the network
of regions more active in the 3-object than 1-object con-
dition (Figure 4A). Conversely, the presence of the social
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stimuli was associated with greater activation in a large
bilateral network of temporal, precuneus, and dorsal MPFC
regions that mostly did not overlap with those regions
more activated in the 3-object than 1-object contrast, ex-
cept in the posterior parts of the middle temporal gyrus
bilaterally, the precuneus, and part of the left superior
occipital gyrus (Figure 4A). Thus, the presence of social
stimuli led to increased BOLD signal in a number of regions
that form the social brain network, from face and eye gaze-
sensitive brain regions along the STS (Haxby, Hoffman, &
Gobbini, 2000), body-sensitive regions in the extrastriate
body area (Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 2007), to mentaliz-
ing regions in the posterior STS and the MPFC (Frith &
Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). More specifically,
the STS activation observed in this Director Present versus
Director Absent contrast extends into a pSTS region pre-
viously observed to show increased BOLD when partici-
pants planned or recognized each otherʼs communicative
intentions (Noordzij et al., 2010). The MPFC activation was
dorsal and aligned with the activations observed in tasks
requiring mentalizing or trait judgments made on others
rather than judgment made on the self (Van Overwalle,
2009; Mitchell et al., 2006). In addition, although the MPFC
activation observed in the current study is located in quite
a superior dorsal part of the MPFC, recent meta-analyses
suggest that mentalizing activations extend over a wide
range of coordinates in the MPFC (Van Overwalle, 2009,
2011) and that non-story-based theory ofmind studies tend
to show more superior activations than story-based theory
of mind studies (Mar, 2011). The Director Present con-
dition also likely led participants to associate the male or
female voice heard with the male or female director char-
acter presented visually. Activations along the STS have
been reported in a study of the encoding of speaker iden-
tity in the cortical surface (Formisano, De Martino, Bonte,
& Goebel, 2008), and the STS has been shown to represent
the integration of auditory–visual integration of faces and
voices (Chandrasekaran & Ghazanfar, 2009).
It is noteworthy that the current Director Present ver-
sus Director Absent contrast was collapsed across a con-
dition requiring participants to take into account the
directorʼs perspective (3-object) and a condition where
the directorʼs perspective was not necessary to identify
the target object (1-object). Thus, here, the mere pres-
ence of the directors and possibly the integration of the
auditory instruction and the directorʼs visual representa-
tion (Chandrasekaran & Ghazanfar, 2009; Formisano
et al., 2008) were sufficient to elicit activations in the
mentalizing network. This finding is consistent with the
suggestion that MPFC plays a broad role in general social
cognition (Saxe & Powell, 2006; see also Saxe, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009). An alternative ac-
count is that, although mentalizing was not necessary in
the 1-object condition, participants nonetheless com-
puted the directorʼs perspective. We did not make a dis-
tinction between 1-object and 3-object blocks during the
training phase or during scanning; thus; participants may
have computed the directorʼs perspective on all trials
rather than deciding whether it was necessary to do so
on a block-by-block or trial-by-trial basis. In line with this
interpretation, previous research provides evidence that
mentalizing can happen even when it is unnecessary (e.g.,
Back & Apperly, 2010; Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010)
and even when it actively impedes performance on themain
task (e.g., Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Samson,
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010).
Our second prediction was that the Director Present
vs. Director Absent comparison may show age-related
decreases in activation in the dorsal MPFC and increases
in the temporal cortex, associated with the processing of
social information. No significant Age Group × Director
interaction was observed, suggesting that the age groups
in fact did not differ in their average social brain response
to the Director Present stimuli. To summarize, in this
study we observed both domain-general activations in
cognitive control regions (3-object vs. 1-object contrast)
and domain-specific activations associated with the pro-
cessing of social cues (Director Present vs. Director Absent
contrast).
The Use of Perspective Information
to Guide Action Selection
The reliance on social cues was associated with faster RTs
than the use of symbolic cues in 3-object trials (compared
with responses in 1-object trials; Figure 2B). Whole-brain
analyses did not reveal regions exhibiting an interaction
between Director and Object factors, and Director, Object,
and Age Groups. However, ROI analyses of the clusters ob-
tained in the Director Present vs. Director Absent contrast
showed that the left temporal and superior dorsal MPFC
clusters exhibited increased activation in the DP 3-object
condition (Figure 4B). In the superior dorsal MPFC, this
Director × Object interaction was further modulated by
Age Group, reflecting the fact that the increase in BOLD
signal in DP 3-object trials was observed in the adults only
(Figure 4B). Our third prediction was that age effects on
the social brain activation, in particular, in the MPFC and
temporal cortex, if not observed in the Director Present
versus Director Absent contrast, might have been more
specific to the Director Present 3-object condition, which
requires the on-line use of perspective taking information.
Our results do show significant age effects in dorsal MPFC
(although the pattern in the temporal cortex is qualitatively
similar, there was no significant interaction with Age
Group); however, the pattern of changes in activation with
age is more complex than that predicted from the literature
and discussed below. Note that a limitation of this study is
that these findings obtained using ROI analyses are con-
sequently weaker than the whole-brain findings described
in the previous sections.
Although small, the three-way interaction with age ob-
served in the current study provides interesting new in-
formation regarding the development of the social brain
Dumontheil et al. 2091
during adolescence. Previous studies have consistently
reported greater MPFC activations in adolescents than
adults in a variety of social cognition tasks (see Blakemore,
2008, for a review of the earlier studies; Gunther Moor
et al., 2012; Sebastian et al., 2012; Pfeifer et al., 2009;
Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, & Blakemore, 2008). The tasks
used typically required participants to make an explicit
judgment regarding the mental states of a character in
a scenario presented in animations (Moriguchi, Ohnishi,
Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007), drawings (Sebastian
et al., 2012; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006), or text
(Burnett et al., 2008; Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury,
& Frith, 2007). Two studies required participants to judge
how much a phrase (e.g., “I am popular”) described them-
selves (Pfeifer et al., 2009; Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto,
2007), and one study involved participants judging a per-
sonʼs emotion from photos of their eyes (Gunther Moor
et al., 2012). Thus, participants were asked to reflect
on their own or someoneʼs thoughts or emotions in an
explicit and somewhat detached manner, and the results
showed that in such situations there are greater BOLD
signal increases in adolescents than adults in the MPFC.
In this study, participants were required to use social cues
regarding the perspective and knowledge of another per-
son in an on-line manner and in a communicative context
and then to perform the appropriate action. Interestingly,
our results show that the adolescents did not recruit dorsal
MPFC specifically in the perspective taking condition (Di-
rector Present 3-object) but more generally whenever the
stimuli had a social aspect, that is, in the comparison of
Director Present versus Director Absent. Adults, however,
showed greater dorsal MPFC activations that were specific
to the Director Present 3-object trials, that is, when infor-
mation about the directorʼs perspective had to be taken
into account to respond appropriately.
These results cast some light on the possible inter-
pretation of previous findings of greater MPFC activa-
tions during mentalizing in adolescents. In previous
studies, it is not clear whether this greater MPFC activa-
tion is due to adolescents “overmentalizing” in response
to the same stimuli, or having to put in more work in
terms of neural resources to achieve the same mentaliz-
ing computations or to lower signal-to-noise ratio asso-
ciated with increased prefrontal gray matter volumes in
adolescence compared with adulthood (see Blakemore,
2008). Recent work using other tasks suggests that de-
creases in brain activation during adolescence do not
necessarily reflect concomitant gray matter volumes de-
creases (Dumontheil, Hassan, Gilbert, & Blakemore,
2010; Dumontheil, Houlton, Christoff, & Blakemore,
2010). The current study provides no evidence that ado-
lescents use more neural effort to achieve the same men-
talizing performance: In the absence of differences in
performance, adolescents did not show greater activa-
tions than adults in Director Present 3-object trials, which
require participants to take the directorʼs perspective
into account. Instead, adolescents appeared to show less
specific mentalizing MPFC activations than adults, with
MPFC activations observed at a similar level in Director
Present 1-object and 3-object trials. These findings are
thus more consistent with the overmentalizing interpre-
tation of the greater MPFC activations observed during
adolescence in previous studies. The pattern of results
observed in the dorsal MPFC in the current study is similar
to the finding of a lack of specificity of right TPJ activation
in early childhood in a verbal story-based task (Saxe et al.,
2009). Among children aged 6–11 years old, the right TPJ
was similarly recruited when the younger children listened
to sections of a story describing a characterʼs thoughts
(Mental condition) or appearance and social relationships
(People), whereas older children showed right TPJ activa-
tion only for the Mental condition (Saxe et al., 2009), thus
showing increased right TPJ specificity for theory of mind
with age.
To summarize, the current study showed that adoles-
cents exhibited dorsal MPFC activation in both social con-
ditions and did not show the specific increased dorsal
MPFC activation observed in adults when the trial re-
quired the participant to take into account the directorʼs
perspective to choose the appropriate response.
Ecological Validity of the Task
The communicative nature of the task employed here is
more ecologically valid than the previous theory of mind
tasks employed in neuroimaging experiments. By using
this task, we are addressing recent concerns that story-
based theory of mind tasks might add processing demands
that are not directly linked to the computation of mental
states (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys,
2004). Another advantage of our paradigm is that it contrib-
utes to the disentanglement of different theory of mind
subprocesses: It is seemingly contradictory that infants
know what another person can or cannot see (Moll &
Tomasello, 2006; Flavell, Abrahams Everett, Croft, & Flavell,
1981) and that adults calculate other peopleʼs perspective
automatically (Samson et al., 2010), but that there is a pro-
tracted development of performance on our perspective
taking task and that even adults have a high error rate. This
study adds to the growing body of work that distinguishes
between processes that might be relatively specific to
theory of mind, perhaps corresponding to social brain net-
work activations, and processes that are domain-general
but equally necessary for actually using theory of mind
information to select an appropriate action or verbal re-
sponse, perhaps corresponding to cognitive control network
activations (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, &
Humphreys, 2005; Saxe et al., 2004, 2006; see Apperly,
2011, for discussion). Here, we have shown that both
domain-general and domain-specific activations showed de-
velopmental changes. Adolescents showed a combination
of weaker lateral PFC activations that were not specific to
the social condition and social brain activations, in particu-
lar, in the MPFC, that showed less specificity to perspective
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taking requirements compared with adults. The hypoactiva-
tion of cognitive control regions in the adolescents may be
behind the greater egocentric bias observed in a similar
paradigm during adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, et al.,
2010). Future studies with greater number of adolescent
participants could investigate in more details the observed
effects and test their association with pubertal develop-
ment as opposed to chronological age only (Blakemore,
Burnett, & Dahl, 2010), as well as the connectivity between
the cognitive control and social brain networks.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to investigate the development
of the neural substrates associated with the selection of
action among distractors and with the use of social cues
to guide action selection. We used a novel paradigm that
requires participants to use either symbolic rules or per-
spective information of other individuals to select an
appropriate action in a communicative context. Having
previously shown that the on-line use of perspective infor-
mation led to the recruitment of superior dorsal MPFC, left
STS, and anterior temporal cortex regions in adults, we
showed here that adolescents exhibited hypoactivation of
domain-general cognitive control regions in the parietal
cortex and PFC and hyperactivation of parts of the social
brain network, with dorsal MPFC activation observed
whether or not the social cues were necessary to perform
the action appropriately. These results provide further
evidence of the prolonged development of neural sub-
strates of social cognition. They suggest that the pattern
of increased MPFC activations in adolescence associated
with explicit mentalizing judgments (Burnett & Blakemore,
2009) is not found when mentalizing has to be used on-
line by taking anotherʼs perspective in an active communi-
cative context. Instead, MPFC showed increased activations
in adolescence in both the 1- and 3-object conditions,
whereas adults engagedMPFCmore for 3-object condition.
This pattern may reflect overmentalizing in adolescence
in conditions where mentalizing is not needed (1-object
condition).
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